{"id":12319,"date":"2025-01-08T15:52:10","date_gmt":"2025-01-08T20:52:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.vdh.virginia.gov\/news\/?page_id=12319"},"modified":"2026-04-03T14:59:35","modified_gmt":"2026-04-03T18:59:35","slug":"richmond-water-plant-response","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.vdh.virginia.gov\/news\/richmond-water-plant-response\/","title":{"rendered":"Richmond Water Plant Response"},"content":{"rendered":"
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FAQs<\/a>\u00a0 \u2666 Reports<\/a> \u00a0\u2666 News Releases<\/a> \u00a0\u2666 Additional Information<\/a>\u00a0 \u2666 Media<\/a><\/p>\n

On Monday, Jan. 6, a winter weather-related power outage impacted operations at the City of Richmond\u2019s water plant along the James River. As a result, the <\/span>City of Richmond<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Henrico County<\/span><\/a>, Goochland County<\/a>, and <\/span>parts of Hanover County<\/span><\/a> were put under a Boil Water Advisory<\/a><\/span>. As January 11, the City of Richmond<\/a> and the counties of Henrico<\/a>, Goochland<\/a> and Hanover<\/a> have lifted their Boil Water Advisories.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On April 16, Governor Glenn Youngkin released<\/a> the final report<\/a> from the Virginia Department of Health (VDH) on the January 2025 water crisis in the City of Richmond and announced a second notice of violation against the city that requires the implementation of a Corrective Action Plan.<\/p>\n

This page provides information on the Virginia Department of Health's (VHD) response and investigation.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Update:<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Sanitary Survey Report<\/a> was added on April 3, 2026.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>

Frequently Asked Questions<\/h3>
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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t Was there an investigation?\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
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Yes, at the direction of Governor Youngkin, VDH, partnered with engineering firm Short Elliott Hendrickson, Inc. (SEH), to conduct its own investigation.\u00a0 The final report<\/a> was issued on April 16. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Additionally, on January 23, VDH\u2019s ODW issued an <\/span>Initial Notice of Alleged Violation<\/span><\/a> (NOAV) to the City of Richmond pursuant to <\/span>Code of Virginia \u00a712VAC5-590-110<\/span>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On February 21, Richmond DPU responded to the Initial NOAV<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On March 11, ODW issued a letter<\/a>\u00a0to DPU and the Richmond mayor regarding Richmond's NOAV Response<\/a>.<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t

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The water crisis was completely avoidable and should not have happened. The Department of Public Utilities (DPU) management and leadership made at least three critical errors in their operational decisions, which caused the water crisis. First, DPU operated the water treatment plant (WTP) in \u201cWinter mode,\u201d meaning that the WTP only used the overhead main power feed during the winter months as a cost saving measure. This decision unnecessarily created a single point of failure without adequate redundancy and was the exact wrong season to do it. DPU has stopped operating in this mode. The water crisis would never have happened if DPU had operated the plant in \u201cSummer mode,\u201d such that both the overhead and underground power feeds were supplying power to the WTP.<\/p>\n

Next, DPU knew that flooding of critical electrical and pumping systems was a risk for decades; yet did not take appropriate actions to properly maintain critical back-up systems powering valves that must be shut to prevent flooding. The Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) battery back-up systems powering the valves were not properly maintained and were past their design lives. Operators reported that they knew the UPSs did not work; yet DPU did not address it. Had DPU properly tested, maintained, and replaced the UPS battery back-ups (every 3-5 years), then the water crisis would not have happened. Since the water crisis DPU has replaced the UPS battery back-ups and properly tested them.<\/p>\n

Finally, DPU allowed the plant to become overly reliant on manual operation. The WTP should have more automatic operation. The back-up diesel generators were useless in the power failure because the back-up generators required manual start and were tied to the single point of failure, Switchgear 6, from \u201cWinter mode\u201d operation. Given the WTP\u2019s need for significant manual operation, DPU did not have enough trained staff, specifically an electrician, at the WTP during a known weather event, even though the governor and mayor had issued emergency declarations. Had the back-up diesel generators been automatically available with both the overhead and underground main power feeds activated (\u201cSummer mode\u201d), then the water crisis would not have happened. DPU is in the process of improving automation at the WTP. The back-up diesel generators should be automatically operated by October 2025.<\/p>\n

The three improper operational decisions were a symptom of institutional complacency. DPU staff had a culture of not reporting problems or not promptly repairing and maintaining equipment. Flooding was a known hazard at the WTP for decades; yet, there was institutional acceptance that problematic conditions such as possible flooding at the WTP were normal and could not be changed or fixed. DPU staff did not worry enough about these problems. DPU had not updated its emergency response plans for a power outage, did not have standard operating procedures to respond to a power outage, and had not practiced or trained DPU management or staff on emergency response awareness. DPU is updating its SOPs for emergency response and has trained staff on emergency response to a power outage.<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t

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Redactions are associated with this FOIA exemption: \u00a7 2.2-3705.2. Exclusions to application of chapter; records relating to public safety.<\/p>\n

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  1. Information contained in (i) engineering, architectural, or construction drawings; (ii) operational, procedural, tactical planning, or training manuals; (iii) staff meeting minutes; or (iv) other records that reveal any of the following, the disclosure of which would jeopardize the safety or security of any person; governmental facility, building, or structure or persons using such facility, building, or structure; or public or private commercial office, multifamily residential, or retail building or its occupants:<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    a. Critical infrastructure information or the location or operation of security equipment and systems of any public building, structure, or information storage facility, including ventilation systems, fire protection equipment, mandatory building emergency equipment or systems, elevators, electrical systems, telecommunications equipment and systems, or utility equipment and systems.<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t

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    VDH is planning a revised, second Notice of Alleged Violation (NOAV) based on the investigation. A NOAV is always required when the Office of Drinking Water believes a regulatory violation occurred. The NOAV outlines the specific observations for each regulation alleged to be in violation. The regulated party, in this case the City of Richmond (as owner and operator of the public water system), is provided with due process and an opportunity to either agree or disagree with the observations or the alleged violation. The NOAV also describes the Office of Drinking Water\u2019s requested actions to eliminate or offset the alleged violation. In this specific situation, the City of Richmond must submit a corrective action plan and time to respond and eliminate the alleged violations.<\/p>\n

    The following regulations were identified in the NOAV previously issued<\/a> to the City of Richmond, but only 12VAC5-590-360.A and 12VAC5-590-510.C were alleged to have been violated based on the facts known at that time.<\/p>\n